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1.  INTRODUCTION 
CHRISTMAS COMES BUT ONCE A YEAR, and with it a boom in the sale of airline tickets, holiday 
bric-a-brac, and fine foods throughout much of the world.  For many items, late Fall is by far the 
year’s most important sales period but airline travel has other important seasons, depending on 
national holidays, local customs, and climate.  Demand for personal tax services peaks just prior 
to a common national filing date.  In regions with extreme continental climates, sales in the 
construction, hospitality, wedding, hobby, and recreation sectors follow the weather.  Food 
consumption baskets reflect the season.  Demand for daycare services change with the local 
school calendar, while public spending can depend on election cycles.  Electricity demand has a 
daily cycle, overlaying a weekly cycle, overlaying an annual cycle.  Commerce beats to cyclic 
rhythms that originate in nature, institutional timetables, culture, and religion.  Yet the 
adjustments necessary to adapt over a cycle come at a cost. 
Economics has long emphasized the word ‘cycle’ in describing the evolution of equilibrium, 
as in Grandmont (1985).  The focus in this literature has been on cycles in behavior given a 
homogeneous market environment.  It has not been largely on the microeconomic modeling of 
cycles due to heterogeneities in preference and technology primitives.2  This is a pity given the 
importance of seasonal cycles in product and factor markets.  Beaulieu and Miron (1990), for 
example, have found that seasonality accounted for between 50% and 70% of variation in U.S. 
manufacturing production and shipments over the years 1967-87, as well as about 50% of 
national variation in employment and hours worked.  Prices and wages tended to be much less 
seasonal, most likely due in part to temporal arbitrage for storable goods.  Beaulieu and Miron 
also found that there tended to be more than one local production peak for the United States 
within the yearly economic cycle.  Braun and Evans (1998) have identified seasonal cycles in 
total factor productivity growth, where productivity grows fastest in the fourth quarter. 
The motivation for our paper is the belief that, while no economy is immune from random 
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shocks, much can be learned by identifying regularities as a market or economy moves through 
time.  We focus on non-storable goods and services such as hospitality and professional services, 
electricity, and perishable produce, where temporal arbitrage is of limited relevance.  For these 
markets, the paper’s intent is to develop a market equilibrium model that accommodates cycles 
in exogenous demand and supply heterogeneities. 
It is hoped that the methods used will facilitate researchers seeking to understand life-cycle 
and non-market behavior, as well as optimal and observed macroeconomic policy where cyclic 
behavior can arise.  Inventory cycles are investigated in Laroque (1989), where the presence of 
inventories under tardy price adjustments can induce a business cycle.  Alesina, Roubini, and 
Cohen (1997), to name one of many works, consider the interactions between the parameters of 
political mechanisms and economic policy.  Gale (1996) and Kiminori (1999) show how 
innovation and market power can interact to generate cycle-like behavior in a growth model.  
Cycle-like behavior in the economy can also occur as the result of an exogenous shock, such as 
Abel’s (2003) baby-boom increase in a random birth process.  The work most similar in spirit to 
ours is the literature following a paper by Grandmont (1985), e.g., Bhattacharya and Russell 
(2003), where deterministic cycles are modeled with a dynamical system representation of an 
economy.  In that literature the cycles arise endogenously from asymmetries due to agent age, 
and the analyses rely on methods from chaos theory. 
Our approach is to emphasize the symmetries inherent in a market under adjustment costs 
when there are periodic demand-side and supply-side heterogeneities.  In contrast to the 
dynamical system approach, where the idea is in the background but not used, we will apply 
group theory to provide an understanding of these symmetries.  By showing how adjustment 
costs impose bounds on the evolution of equilibrium market prices and quantities over a cycle, 
our model allows us to indicate when the intensity of demand in a period matches the period’s 
equilibrium consumption level.  It shows too that adjustment costs have a quite targeted effect on 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Some macroeconomics of seasonal cycles have been investigated in detail by Miron (1996). 
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prices and quantities over a cycle.  Price and quantity dispersion can be affected, but their means 
need not change. 
The model also provides a clarification on how the gains from smoothing production over 
time trade off with the gains from greater dispersion in production conditions over the cycle.  
Adjustment costs suggest that instability in the production environment should be detrimental to 
the amount of surplus a market generates.  Yet standard convexity arguments suggest that more 
dispersion should be beneficial because one can adjust production appropriately.  We use group 
theory to parse the difference and find that a precisely qualified increase in the dispersion of 
market conditions increases the surplus generated over the cycle.  Of course, the ability to 
engage in spatial arbitrage matters in all of this.  We will analyze an environment where spatial 
arbitrage, or external trade, is not possible and also where it is. 
The main body of the paper commences by specifying the market model absent external 
trade opportunities.  After providing an overview of the tools we use to model symmetries, we 
analyze equilibrium.  We identify and characterize production and pricing cycles, as well as 
welfare effects over the primitive sources of seasonal heterogeneities.  We develop a precise 
solution under linear demand and quadratic adjustment costs.  The opportunity to trade outside 
the market is then introduced. 
 
2.  MODEL 
The market is competitive and there are N production periods within the cycle.  For cultural, 
climatic, or other reasons, demand varies across these periods.  These demand heterogeneities 
are captured by parameter vector Nα ∈\ , the reals in N dimensions, with entries ,n nα ∈ 
{0,1, ... , 1} NN − ≡ Ω .  Period inverse demand, aggregated over consumers, is given as ( )n np q =  
( ),n n NA q nα − ∈Ω , where nq +∈\  (i.e., non-negative) is the amount consumed in the period and 
( )nA q  is strictly increasing.  No other technical assumptions on demand are required. 
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Period markets clear in the absence of storage.  The industry’s cost function is comprised of 
two parts.  There is a period-specific cost function with unit period shifters, ( ),n n nq Y q nβ + ∈  
NΩ , where nβ  is labeled the period unit cost and ( ) :nY q + +→\ \  is a weakly increasing and 
weakly convex function.  Coordinate nβ  is the n+1st entry in vector Nβ ∈\ .  There are also 
adjustment costs.  As is standard in market models involving adjustment, aggregate adjustment 
costs are of form 1( )n nB q q −−  where the function is convex and continuously differentiable with 
(0) 0B = .3  Note that closure of the cycle requires adjustment costs for the first period to be 
0 1( )NB q q −− ; it should not matter when the cycle is initiated.  
Summing, industry costs over the cycle are  
(2.1) 1 1 1 10 0 0( ) ( ),
N N N
n n n n nn n n
Y q q B q qβ− − − −= = =+ + −∑ ∑ ∑  
where it is understood that 1 1Nq q− −= .  We will at times require some additional structure on 
1( )n nB q q −− .  Function ( )B ⋅  is centrally symmetric, or ( )B CS⋅ ∈ , whenever ( ) ( )B Bδ δ δ≡ − ∀  
∈\ .  The period quadratic adjustment cost function 21( ) , 0n nq qτ τ−× − > , is in CS. 
There are no externalities in our model, and we seek only to better understand market cycles 
under period heterogeneities and adjustment costs.  The solution the market supports is the same 
as that supported by the central planner.  Market welfare is given by  
(2.2) 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 00( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
nqN N N N
n n n n nn n n n
W q q Y q A q dq B q qγ− − − − −= = = == − − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∫  
where 0 2 1( , , ... , )
N
Nq q q q − += ∈\  and n n nγ α β= − .  The market will “choose” *q q=  to 
maximize ( )W q .  We assume throughout that *q  is interior on N+\ , and prices are *( )n np q =  
*( )n nA qα − . 
Our interest is in cycles, and a digression is warranted on the determination of N.  The cycle 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Sargent (1987) and papers referenced in chapters XIV and XV of that book.  All of 
these references assume the particular case of quadratic adjustment costs. 
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must replicate and the only heterogeneities are in vectors α  and β .  If sequence 0 1, , ... ,α α  
, ...nα  replicates every Nα  entries and 0 1, , ... , , ...nβ β β  replicates every Nβ  entries then 
choose N as the least common multiple of the two.  This will be the periodicity of sequence 
0 1, , ... , , ...nγ γ γ . 
 
3.  SYMMETRY ISSUES: CYCLIC AND DIHEDRAL GROUPS 
Expression (2.2) possesses interesting symmetries.  The sum 1 1
0 0 0
( ) ( )n
qN N
nn n
Y q A q dq− −= =+∑ ∑ ∫  
is permutation invariant; the value is the same when any ,i Nq i∈Ω  is interchanged with any jq , 
Nj∈Ω .  There are less apparent symmetries in expression 1 10 ( )
N
n nn
B q q− −= −∑ .  To understand 
these we introduce the modulo N function on the integer set { ... , 1,0,1, ... }= −] .  The function, 
written as modN( )n , maps n to its remainder upon division by N.  If, for example, 27n =  and 
12N =  then mod12(27) 27 2 12 3= − × = .  Observe that  
(3.1) 1 11 modN( ) modN( 1)0 0( ) ( ) .
N N
n n n i n in n
B q q B q q i− −− + + −= =− ≡ − ∀ ∈∑ ∑ ]  
Mathematically, the function is invariant under a cyclic group.  In general, a group is a set 
of operations, or group elements, that satisfy four properties under composition.4  Label the 
group itself as G , comprised of operation set G together with the composition operation * on 
ordered pairs of the operation set.  The cardinality of G, | |G , is called the group’s order.  The 
set must be closed so that if 1 2,g g G∈  then 1 2*g g G∈ .  The set must also have an identity, e; 
for any g G∈  then e G∈  satisfies * *e g g e g= = .  The set’s elements must satisfy 
associativity so that for any 1 2 3, ,g g g G∈  the order of association does not matter, 1 2 3( * ) *g g g  
1 2 3* ( * )g g g= .  Finally, for each g G∈  there must be an unique inverse element, call it 1g− , 
                                                 
4 Barnard and Neill provide an introduction to elementary group theory.  See Hennessy and 
Lapan (2003a, 2003b) for further examples and applications in economic contexts. 
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such that 1 1* *g g g g e− −≡ ≡ . 
Our interest is entirely in groups where | |G  is finite, and we have specific interest in three 
types of groups.  For function 0 1 1( , , ... , )NF x x x − , there is the group that leaves ( )F ⋅  invariant 
under any permutation of arguments, i.e., 1 1 1 1( ... , , , , ... , , , , ... )i i i j j jF x x x x x x− + − + ≡  
1 1 1 1( ... , , , , ... , , , , ... ) ,i j i j i j NF x x x x x x i j− + − + ∀ ∈Ω .  This is called the symmetric group, NS , on 
set NΩ .  There are !N  ways (i.e., elements of G) to permute N objects, and so | | !NS N= .  The 
group is of passing interest in the paper, and it was already encountered when asserting that 
1 1
0 0 0
( ) ( )n
qN N
nn n
Y q A q dq− −= =+∑ ∑ ∫  is permutation invariant. 
Two other groups are of more direct interest as they are derived from the concept of cyclic 
patterns in the state of the market.  One is the cyclic group on N elements, labeled NC  with 
element set NC , and the other is the dihedral group on N elements, labeled ND  with element set 
ND .  Both are most easily described using Cayley tables, to be explained shortly. 
Consider function 0 1 2 3 4( , , , , )F x x x x x  with invariance 0 1 2 3 4( , , , , )F x x x x x ≡  
4 0 1 2 3( , , , , )F x x x x x , which is labeled 1g  so that 1g  substitutes 0 1 2 3 4 0x x x x x x→ → → → → .  
Now, by the group closure requirement, 1 1*g g G∈  and label it as 2g .  This operation represents 
the invariance 0 1 2 3 4 3 4 0 1 2( , , , , ) ( , , , , )F x x x x x F x x x x x≡ .  Continuing, 3 1 2*g g g G= ∈ , 4g =  
1 3*g g G∈  and 5 1 4*g g g e G= = ∈ .  Thus, five-fold repetition of 1g  cycles the function back to 
its initial state and it is the group identity element.  Cayley table 1, in appendix A, captures this 
cycling behavior. 
Notice how the table’s second row is a backward cycling of the first.  This is precisely the 
invariance discerned in (3.1) above.  Cyclic groups have a generating operation (generator) the 
repetition of which generates the whole group.  In the case of 5C  above, it happens that any 
element other than e  will do but let us assign 1g  to be the generator.  In general, NC  is the 
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underlying group that represents invariance under the cyclic shuffle of a function’s arguments 
0 1 2 1 1 0 3 2 1 2 1 0( , , ... , , ) ( , , ... , , ) ... ( , , ... , , )N N N N N NF x x x x F x x x x F x x x x− − − − − −≡ ≡ ≡ .  
A more subtle invariance arises in expression 1 10 ( )
N
n nn
B q q− −= −∑  when ( )B CS⋅ ∈ .  With 
5N = , aggregate adjustment costs are 0 4 1 0 2 1 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )B q q B q q B q q B q q− + − + − + − +  
4 3( )B q q− .  To be sure it has the symmetries of NC .  But under central symmetry we may also 
change 0 0q q↔ , 1 4q q↔ , and 2 3q q↔  where subscripts always sum to 0, modulo 5.  Then the 
summation of adjustment costs is invariant, i.e.,  
(3.2) 0 4 1 0 2 1 3 2 4 3
1 0 0 4 4 3 3 2 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
B q q B q q B q q B q q B q q
B q q B q q B q q B q q B q q
− + − + − + − + − →
− + − + − + − + −  
Labeling as 1h  the operation of simultaneously mapping 0 0q q↔ , 1 4q q↔ , and 2 3q q↔  then 
the group of invariances on aggregate adjustment costs must be extended.  The extension, 
dihedral group 5D , has 10 elements and may be represented as Cayley table 2 in appendix A.   
Operation 1h  is a second generator, generating four new operations to ensure closure as a 
group including the elements of 5C .  The additional group elements are 2 1 1*h g h= , 3 2 1*h g h= , 
4 3 1*h g h= , and 5 4 1*h g h= .  More generally, ND  may be obtained from NC  by including the 
additional invariances on some ( ) : NF x →\ \  that are generated by a permutation i jx x↔ ∀  
, Ni j∈Ω  such that 0i j+ = , modulo N. 
A comparison of tables 1 and 2 suggests a property that is more generally true.  The upper 
left-hand quarter of table 2 is an exact replica of table 1.  Defining a subgroup of G  as a subset 
of G that is a group in its own right, it is seen that 5C  is a subgroup of 5D  and the relation is 
written as 5 5C D⊆  .  It is always true that N NC D⊆  .  Furthermore, since NC  and ND  are 
restrictions on the set of all permutation operations on N objects, NS , inclusion extends to NC  
N ND S⊆ ⊆  .  If ( )F x  is invariant when G  acts on its arguments and if H G⊆   then ( )F x  is 
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invariant when H  acts on its arguments. 
One further concept is needed, that of a group acting on a vector.  For Nx∈\ , write gx  as 
the map of x under g G∈ .  For instance, 1g  has been previously labeled as the cyclic map 0x →  
1 2 3 4 0x x x x x→ → → → .  Then 1 4 0 1 2 3( , , , , )Tgx x x x x x=  where superscripted T represents the 
transpose operation.  When a description of how 1g  acts on the subscripts is needed then write 
1 (0) 4g
x x= , meaning that 0x  is replaced by 4x .  Given the symmetries in (2.2), i.e., ( )B ⋅  is “ NC -
symmetric” or “ NC -invariant” while it is ND -invariant under ( )B CS⋅ ∈ , we are in a position to 
analyze market equilibrium. 
 
4.  EQUILIBRIUM CHOICES 
Expression 1 1 1 10 0 00( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
nqN N N
n n nn n n
H q Y q A q dq B q q− − − −= = == + + −∑ ∑ ∑∫  is NC -invariant.  Due 
to the absence of externalities, *( )W q  cannot be improved upon.  Given the NC  invariances in 
( )H q , we have * *( ) ( )g NH q H q g C= ∀ ∈ .  Similarly, if ( )B CS⋅ ∈  then * *( ) ( )g NH q H q g D= ∀ ∈ .  
From * *( ) ( )gH q H q= , inequality * *( ) ( )gW q W q≥  implies 
PROPOSITION 1:  For market surplus as laid out in (2.2), then  
(4.1) 1 1* *( )0 0 .
N N
n n n g n Nn n
q q g Cγ γ− −= =≥ ∀ ∈∑ ∑   
If, in addition, ( )B CS⋅ ∈  then  
(4.2) 1 1* * ( )0 0 .
N N
n n n g n Nn n
q q g Dγ γ− −= =≥ ∀ ∈∑ ∑  
 
Two especially simple cases arise.  When the group is 2C  in the two-period setting then 
(4.1) may be written as * *1 0 1 0( )( ) 0q qγ γ− − ≥ .5  The second simple case is when the group is 3D  
                                                 
5 In a 2-period model, adjustment costs cannot be distinguished from costs of varying production.  
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and (4.2) provides six inequalities under ( )B CS⋅ ∈ , each corresponding to a permutation of 
0 1 2( , , )q q q .  To see this, consider cumulated adjustment costs 1 0 2 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( )B q q B q q B q q− + − + −  
and permute any pair of production choices, say 1 2q q↔ , 1 0 2 1 0 2( ) ( ) ( )B q q B q q B q q− + − + − ≡  
0 2 2 1 1 0( ) ( ) ( )B q q B q q B q q− + − + − .  Regardless of which of the six permutations on 0 1 2( , , )q q q  
is enacted, the sum of adjustment costs is invariant because 3D  and 3S  are the same.  So if 
* * *
0 1 2( , , )q q q  is optimum then 
* *
3( )( ) 0 ,i j i jq q i jγ γ− − ≥ ∀ ∈Ω .  Otherwise, some rearrangement of 
* * *
0 1 2( , , )q q q  would increase the value of ( )W q  so that the central planner would not maximize 
social surplus. 
When 4N ≥  or under 3C  then the constraints as laid out in proposition 1 cannot be 
interpreted quite as cleanly.  A graph for the case of 3C  does demonstrate much of what the 
constraint sets can and cannot relate.  
EXAMPLE 1:  For 0 1 2( , , )γ γ γ , write period outputs as share deviations 2* * *0[ /( )n n nnq qµ == ∑  
1/ 3]−  so as to develop expressions that capture correlation attributes.  Similarly, write nλ =  
2
0
3 /( ) 1n nnγ γ= −∑  so that 2 2*0 00n nn nµ λ= == =∑ ∑  and (4.1) becomes 
(4.3) * * * * * *0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 00, 0.λ µ λ µ λ µ λ µ λ µ λ µ+ + ≥ + + ≥  
Both relations, when specified with equality, pass through the origin in * *0 1( , )µ µ  space.  If 1 0λ ≤  
and 0 0λ ≤  then both relations, when specified with equality, have negative slopes.  An example 
of the set of admissible points, *0 1/ 3µ ≥ −  and *1 1/ 3µ ≥ −  such that (4.3) holds, is described as 
the shaded quadrilateral (including the contained blackened triangle) in figure 1.6 
Included also in the figure is the absolute bound under *2 1/ 3µ = − , the lower limit on *2µ .  
                                                                                                                                                             
Hennessy and Roosen (2003) study symmetries of choices in a 2-period seasonal cost model. 
6 Figure 1 is a temporal production analog to figure 1 in the Hennessy and Lapan (2003b) 
analysis of portfolio decisions. 
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This bound is represented by * *0 1 1/ 3µ µ+ = , and the shaded quadrilateral is strictly interior to the 
hyperplane the bound defines.  Notice that the production shares over the cycle are broadly 
consistent with the relative preference intensity patterns 1 0λ ≤ , 0 0λ ≤ .  Notice too that the 
diagram assumes 1 00 λ λ> >  because 0 1 1( ) /(3 ) 2 / 3λ λ λ+ > .  If ( )B CS⋅ ∈ , so that the dihedral 
group applies, then the area can be further refined.  To be specific, the diagram already assumes 
2 1 00λ λ λ> > >  and straightforward calculations confirm the admissible area under 3D  to be the 
blackened subset. 
 
The invariances also have consequences for equilibrium prices over the cycle.  Write 
*( )n np q  as the n+1
st period equilibrium price under price-taking.  Then optimize over the social 
planner’s objective function (2.2) to obtain 
(4.4) * * * * * *1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ,n n n q n q n n q n n Np q Y q B q q B q q nβ − +− − − − + − = ∀ ∈Ω  
where the subscripted q indicates a differentiation and the modulo arithmetic wrap-around at 
0n =  and 1n N= −  is understood.7  Analysis, provided in appendix B, supports 
PROPOSITION 2:  For market surplus as laid out in (2.2), then  
(4.5) 1 1* * * * ( )0 0( ) ( ) .
N N
n n n n n n n g n Nn n
p q q p q q g Cβ β− −= =   − ≥ − ∀ ∈   ∑ ∑  
If, in addition, ( )B CS⋅ ∈  then  
(4.6) 1 1* * * * ( )0 0( ) ( ) .
N N
n n n n n n n g n Nn n
p q q p q q g Dβ β− −= =   − ≥ − ∀ ∈   ∑ ∑  
 
Neither part of the proposition asserts that high price months, net of period-specific unit 
costs, are matched with high output months.  Both parts do suggest a more positive alignment 
                                                 
7 For a price-taking firm, the solution to (4.4) is not unique in the special case where ( )nY q  is 
linear.  In that case, if *q  solves (4.4) then so does * (1,1, ... ,1)Tq θ+ × .  Decreasing demand 
closes the model. 
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relative to other group maps on *q , i.e., relative to *gq .  Together, propositions 1 and 2 suggest a 
relationship between net prices *( )n n np q β−  and net demand parameters nγ .  This is because net 
demand parameters tend to align with outputs and outputs tend to align with net prices.  The 
relationship does indeed follow for certain small order groups. 
COROLLARY 2.1:  A) When 2N =  then * * * *1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0[ ( ) ( ) ]( ) 0p q p q q qβ β− − + − ≥ .  
Furthermore, * *1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0[ ( ) ( ) ]( ) 0p q p qβ β γ γ− − + − ≥ .  
B) When 3N =  and ( )B CS⋅ ∈ , arbitrarily assume 2 1 0γ γ γ≥ ≥ .  Then * * *2 1 0q q q≥ ≥  and 
furthermore * * *2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( )p q p q p qβ β β− ≥ − ≥ − .  
 
Upon identifying an invariance that has not been discussed thus far, a more general 
correlation result can be obtained.  
PROPOSITION 3:  A) Average period unit price equals average period marginal cost, i.e., 
(4.7) 1 1 11 * 1 1 *
0 0 0
( ) ( ).N N Nn n n q nn n nN p q N N Y qβ
− − −− − −
= = == +∑ ∑ ∑  
In addition, if ( ) , 0n n n np q qα κ κ= − >  while 2( ) 0.5 ( ) , 0n nY q qχ χ= × ≥  then aggregate output 
over the cycle is ( )1 11*0 0N Nn nn nq κ χ γ− −−= == +∑ ∑ . 
B) Output is positively correlated with prices net of period cost parameters, i.e., 
1 1* * * *
0 0
[ ( ) ] [ ( ) )]N Nn n n n n n nn np q q q p qβ β
− −
= =− ≥ −∑ ∑  where 1* 1 *0N nnq N q−− == ∑ .  Output is positively 
correlated with net demand parameters, i.e., 1 1* *
0 0
N N
n n nn n
q qγ γ− −= =≥∑ ∑ .  
 
Equation (4.7) asserts that equilibrium marginal cost pricing applies when the whole cycle is 
considered.  Part A) also provides conditions such that mean output over the cycle, *q , must 
increase in response to an increase in any nγ .  Under these linearity conditions, statistic 10
N
nn
γ−=∑  
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is sufficient to determine mean output.8  Part B) describes a positive correlation concerning how 
production adjustments occur to take advantage of external circumstances, and so there should be 
surplus remaining to more than cover adjustment costs.  The existence of adjustment costs does 
not affect the unweighted mean of prices over the cycle, only the extent of price dispersion.  
A second consequence that (4.4) brings to light is the relationship between equilibrium 
prices and the rate of adjustment in production.  Suppose * *( ) ( ) ( )n n n q np q Y qβ≥ ≤ +  so that 
* * * *
1 1( ) ( ) ( )q n n q n nB q q B q q− +− ≥ ≤ − .  Given our assumption of convexity on ( )B ⋅ , * * 1( )q n nB q q −− ≥  
* *
1( ) ( )q n nB q q+≤ −  implies * * * *1 1( )n n n nq q q q− +− ≥ ≤ − .  Now suppose there is a sequence of periods 
such that * * * * * *1 1 1 2 2 2( ), ( ), ... , ( )q q m m q mp Y q p Y q p Y qβ β β≥ + ≥ + ≥ + , where the choice of 1n =  as the 
initiation is without loss of generality.  Write ( ) ( ) ( )n n q nT q A q Y q= + , a strictly increasing 
function with inverse function 1( )T − ⋅ .  The sequence of inequalities may then be read as 
* 1 * 1
1 1( ), ... , ( )m mq T q Tγ γ− −≤ ≤ , and it implies * * * * * *1 2 0 1 1( ) / 2, ... , ( ) / 2m m mq q q q q q+ −≥ + ≥ + .  Such a 
sequence is said to be concave because it possesses as a sequence the properties that a concave 
function possesses.  The sequence with inequality signs reversed is said to be convex, see 
Pe…ariƒ, Proschan, and Tong (1992). 
PROPOSITION 4:  Suppose there is a sequence of periods {1,2, ... , }m  such that optimal output 
is less than output would be if there were no adjustment costs, i.e., * 1 * 11 1( ), ... , ( )m mq T q Tγ γ− −≤ ≤ .  
Then * * * * * *1 2 0 1 1( ) / 2, ... , ( ) / 2m m mq q q q q q+ −≥ + ≥ + .  Suppose instead that optimal output is greater 
than output would be if there were no adjustment costs over that sequence, i.e., * 11 1( ), ... ,q T γ−≥  
* 1( )m mq T γ−≥ .  Then * * * * * *1 2 0 1 1( ) / 2, ... , ( ) / 2m m mq q q q q q+ −≤ + ≤ + . 
 
The finding points to solution harmonics, and further intuition in this regard will be provided 
                                                 
8 An analog exists with Cournot oligopoly in a homogeneous good industry; see, e.g., Salant and 
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when we linearize the model. 
 
5.  SURPLUSES 
Specify social surplus as 
(5.1) ( ) = max ( ).q W qγ‹  
This function is quite structured, as the following definition will help to illustrate.   
DEFINITION 1:  Vector Nu∈\  is cyclic majorized by Nv∈\  with respect to group NC  
(written as 
NC
u v≤  ) if u  lies in the convex hull of the points ,g Nv g C∈ .  If the group is instead 
ND  then u  is said to be dihedral majorized by v  with respect to ND , written as NDu v≤  .  If the 
group is instead NS , then u  is said to be majorized by v , written as NSu v≤  .9 
 
A simple illustration of 
NS
u v≤   should facilitate an understanding of the economics 
underlying the relation.  In 2\ , let 1 2 1 2u u v v+ = +  and 1 2 1 2min[ , ] min[ , ]u u v v≥ .  Then 2Su v≤  .  
Because the sums of vector components have been constrained to be equal, the relation concerns 
dispersion among vector components.  Cyclic majorization is less direct, and is best described 
using matrices.  If 
NC
u v≤   then there exists a vector Nλ +∈\  such that 10 1
N
nn
λ−= =∑  and10  
(5.2) 
0 00 1 1
1 11 0 2
1 2 01 1
.
N
N N
N N
u v
u v
u v
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
−
− −
− −
            =            
#
#
" " % "# #
#
 
A square matrix with rows generated by cyclic action such that the diagonal elements are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Shaffer (1999).  There the sum of marginal cost parameters determines industry output. 
9 Majorization as it is usually understood, 
NS
≤  , has been used widely in the welfare economics of 
income inequality.  See Marshall and Olkin (1979) for more on linear transformation group 
majorization, which is sufficiently general to include all three of the defined relations. 
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the same, as in (5.2), is referred to as a circulant.  A circulant is generated by the transpose of 
the first row as a reference vector, 0 1 1( , , .... , )
T
Nλ λ λ −  in (5.2).  Condition NCu v≤   is more 
restrictive than 
NS
u v≤  , which may be written as the requirement that there exists an N N×  
matrix with non-negative entries ,i jλ , 1 1, ,0 01 , 1
N N
i j N i j Ni j
j iλ λ− −= == ∀ ∈Ω = ∀ ∈Ω∑ ∑ , such that11  
(5.3) 
0,0 0,1 0, 10 0
1,0 1,1 1, 11 1
1,0 1,1 1, 11 1
.
N
N
N N N NN N
u v
u v
u v
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
−
−
− − − −− −
            =             
#
#
" " % "# #
#
 
Intuitively, more dispersion in γ  should increase welfare in our model because welfare 
surplus triangles are convex under location shifts of the defining curves.  How the α  values are 
matched with the β  values should matter too, but this will not be an issue when only the net 
parameter values, n n nγ α β= − , are considered.  Also, how contiguous nγ  parameter values relate 
in the cycle should matter because sudden reversals in preference and cost parameters will 
require large adjustments.  The 
NC
≤   and 
ND
≤   pre-orderings are tailored to accommodate this 
concern about non-smooth cycles. 
PROPOSITION 5:  A) ( ) ( )γ γ′ ′′≤‹ ‹  whenever 
NC
γ γ′ ′′≤  . 
B) If ( )B CS⋅ ∈ , then ( ) ( )γ γ′ ′′≤‹ ‹  whenever 
ND
γ γ′ ′′≤  . 
 
EXAMPLE 2:  In contrast to two and three period contexts, four period contexts do not 
generally lend themselves to graphical analysis.  Nonetheless it is possible to graph the 
dominated convex hull when the reference vector is amenable.  Let the parameter vector, when 
written in deviation form as was done in Example 1, be chosen as realizations of the cosine 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 See Giovagnoli and Wynn (1996, p. 219). 
11 All three relations in definition 1 have the property of bistochasticity.  This means that the 
matrix representation of each convex hull relation has all rows and all columns summing to zero 
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function at / 2π  radian intervals on the real domain with initial observation at / 2π− .  Thus, 
0 1 2 3( , , , ) (0,1,0, 1)λ λ λ λ = − .  With simplex weightings 0 1 2 3( , , , ) 0ω ω ω ω ω= ≥ , 3 0 1kk ω= =∑ , the 
4C  group acts on the vector to generate convex hull 3 1 0 2 1 3 2 0( , , , )ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω− − − − .  Given 
that the first and third coordinates differ only in sign while the same is true of the second and 
fourth coordinates, this convex hull can be compressed into two dimensions.  These will have to 
be either the first and second coordinates, the first and fourth coordinates, the second and third 
coordinates, or the third and fourth coordinates.  In any of these cases the convex hull will be the 
shaded, oriented square given in figure 2, where the axis labels used are 0λ  and 1λ .  Formally, 
the set may be represented as 0 1 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 1{( , , , ) ( , , , ) : 1}λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − + ≤ .   
 
Proposition 5 makes the important distinction between the roles of dispersion and smoothing 
on the production side.  Firms should like more dispersion in unit period cost parameters because 
gains from expanding production in lower cost periods should more than offset losses on 
contracted production in higher cost periods.  But that dispersion cannot be arbitrary, for surely 
in a five period cycle the sequence 0 1 2 3 4 0γ γ γ γ γ γ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′≤ ≤ ≤ ≥ ≥  should be preferred over 0 1γ γ′′ ′′≤ ≥  
2 3 4 0γ γ γ γ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′≤ ≥ ≤  when the sequence 5γ ′′∈\  is a re-arrangement of γ ′ .  Sequence γ ′′  is too 
disrupted to allow smooth adjustments, and adjustment costs will reflect that.  Parts A) and B) 
control for this, so that convexity is availed of and yet adjustment costs are modest.  
 
6.  LINEAR MODEL 
A linear system allows for a precise characterization of production dynamics.  With linear 
demand, period cost 20.5 ( )n n nq qβ χ+ × , and adjustment cost 210.5 ( ) ,n nq qτ τ− +× − ∈\ , then 
equilibrium output is given as:  
                                                                                                                                                             
while all matrix entries are non-negative.  See Marshall and Olkin (1979, pp. 18-23). 
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PROPOSITION 6:  In the linear system with N periods, define /( )n nϑ γ κ χ= + , /( )ξ τ κ χ= + , 
(2 1 ) /(2 )ρ ξ ξ= + + ∆ , and 1 4ξ∆ = + .  Then output choices may be written in the form 
(6.1) 1 1*
0 0
, , 1, 0 .
( 1)
j N j
N N
n m n m j n n NNm n
q u u u u nρ ρϑ ρ
−− −
−= =
+= = = ≥ ∀ ∈Ω∆ × −∑ ∑  
 
The equilibrium effects of parameter dispersion on consumer and producer surplus are not as 
readily obtained as for the welfare effect in proposition 5 because the optimality of markets 
cannot be appealed to.  Knowledge from proposition 6 is useful in this regard.  Write producer 
surplus as ( )γΠ  and consumer surplus as ( )γ^  when viewed as functions of the primitives. 
PROPOSITION 7:  In the linear system,  
A) ( ) ( )γ γ′ ′′Π ≤ Π  whenever 
ND
γ γ′ ′′≤  , and  
B) ( ) ( )γ γ′ ′′≤^ ^  whenever 
ND
γ γ′ ′′≤  .  Furthermore, consumption is more seasonal under γ ′′  in 
the sense that the value of 1 * 2
0
( )N nn s
−
=∑  increases under γ γ′ ′′→ , where 1* * *0/ Nm m nns q q−== ∑ . 
 
Proposition 6 conveys much more about the structure of vector 0 1 1( , , ... , )
T
Nu u u u −=  besides 
its location on the unit simplex.  
PROPOSITION 8:  A) The circulant with reference vector 0 1 1( , , ... , )
T
Nu u u −  is bistochastic, i.e., 
all entries are non-negative, all rows and columns sum to 1. 
B) The weightings are centrally symmetric, i.e., j N j Nu u n−= ∀ ∈Ω .   
C) 0Lim 0 {1,2, ... , 1}ju j Nξ→ = ∀ ∈ − , 0 0Lim 1uξ→ = , and 1Lim j Nu N jξ −→∞ = ∀ ∈Ω . 
D) If ( 1) / 2N n− >  then 1n nu u +≥  and 1 /n nu u+  is increasing in ξ .  If ( 1) / 2N n− <  then 
1n nu u −≥  and 1/n nu u −  is decreasing in ξ .  
E) For the given sum value 1 1
0 0
N N
n nn n
ϑ ϑ− −= =′ ′′=∑ ∑ , suppose 10 1 0m N mn n nn n N m nϑ ϑ ϑ−= = − − =′ ′ ′′+ ≥ +∑ ∑ ∑  
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1
1
{0,1, ... , ( 3) / 2}N nn N m m Nϑ
−
= − − ′′ ∀ ∈ −∑  whenever ( 1) / 2N −  is even and m∀ ∈ 
{0,1, ... , ( 2) / 2}N −  whenever ( 1) / 2N −  is odd.  Then 0 0q q′ ′′≥ . 
F) * */ / ,m m n m m n Ndq d dq d n mϑ ϑ− += ∀ ∈Ω  where modular arithmetic on indices is understood. 
 
The proposition’s findings may be depicted as a figure rather similar to a string between 
parallel walls, see figure 3 where we have assumed a continuous weighting function on [0, )N  
for convenience.  A cyclical sequence is said to be unimodal if it has a single local peak over its 
period.  Due to parts B) and D), the weightings are inverted symmetric unimodal, i.e., lowest 
value is at the middle.  When adjustment costs are small then the preponderant weight is on the 
own-parameter, the string is quite lax.  As adjustment costs increase then the weighting shifts 
toward other parameters.  At the limit of infinite adjustment costs, the weighting is uniform, nu  
1
NN n
−= ∀ ∈Ω .  Further analysis of these observations supports 
PROPOSITION 9:  If 0 1 1( , , ... , )
T
Nϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ −=  is centrally symmetric unimodal, then *q  is 
centrally symmetric unimodal and peak output occurs at the time of the largest coordinate in ϑ . 
 
The central symmetry and unimodality properties are inherited by *q  through convolution 
1*
0
N
n m n mm
q u ϑ− −==∑ .  It is readily shown, though, that neither unimodality only on ϑ  nor central 
symmetry only on ϑ  are sufficient for *q  to be either unimodal or centrally symmetric.  Figure 4 
depicts the proposition’s content.  Consistent with proposition 8, vector u  (given as a continuous 
approximation) is unimodal and centrally symmetric around 0n = .  One example of the 
weighting vector is the sequence with entries 1N −  that arises at the limit as ξ →∞ , see part C).  
More typically, the curve will look like the other curve in figure 4. 
Suppose market parameter vector 0 1 1( , , ... , )
T
Nϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ −=  happens to be centrally symmetric 
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and unimodal around 0n = .  In that case it can be constructed from positive weightings of 
discrete uniform weightings centered around 0n = .  The blackened block is one such weighting 
(as a continuous approximation).  Alternatively, the market parameter vector could be unimodal 
and centrally symmetric around / 2n N=  rather than 0n = .  This situation is represented as the 
pair of patched blocks on either side of / 2n N= , and there are two blocks just because the circle 
representing the cycle was cut at / 2n N=  in order to present it in two dimensions.  In the linear 
model, both market parameter vectors give the same aggregate output, and in each case the 
output vectors are both symmetric and unimodal.  The only difference is that the coordinate 
values in the period output vector are shifted 180 degrees around the cycle.   
If the patched block is moved in either direction toward the center then the value of 0q  will 
be monotone non-decreasing along the trajectory until the patched block rests on the blackened 
block.  The idea holds true more generally for the symmetric unimodal weightings because these 
can be constructed as limits from positive sums of such uniform blocks, see Dharmadhikari and 
Joag-Dev (1988, p. 10).  In fact the idea behind the proposition is known in the statistics 
literature as the moving set inequality, as reported in Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988). 
Proposition 9 suggests that the output vector inherits some structure from the exogenous 
parameter vector.  The inheritance relationship is very clear when the exogenous parameters 
follow the cosine function.  Specifically, let Cos(2 / )m m Nϑ π=  so that ϑ  is unimodal (with 
mode at 0m = ) and centrally symmetric.12  To see that the cosine function (as with the sine 
function) places pertinent structure on the exogenous parameters, pair n  with / 2n N+ .  Then 
notice that Cos(2 / ) (1 ) Cos[2 ( / 2) / ] (2 1) Cos(2 / )n N n N N n Nς π ς π ς π× + − × + ≡ − × ∈  
[Cos(2 / ),Cos[2 ( / 2) / ]] [0,1]n N n N Nπ π ς+ ∀ ∈ .  The convex combination represents a dihedral 
                                                 
12 A constant could be added to the cosine function without affecting the analysis. 
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dominance relation and that relation is synonymous with a reduction in amplitude.  In our case 
the reduction in amplitude is from 1 to | 2 1| 1ς − ≤ . 
PROPOSITION 10:  A) In the linear model, let Cos(2 / )m Nm N mϑ π= ∀ ∈Ω .  Write peak 
output *,0
Nq  as the period 0 output when there are N  outputs.  Then 
(6.2) 
*, * *, * *, *
0 0
*, *
0 2
(6.2A) ( )Cos(2 / ) ( ) ,
( 1)( 1)(6.2B) 0,
[ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1]
N N N
n n
N
q q q q n N q q
q q
N
π ϑ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ π
− = − = −
− +− = >∆ × − × +
 
so that the periods of vectors *q  and ϑ  are the same.  The peak and trough of the vectors occur 
at the same time points while *, *, * 20Var( ) ( ) Var( )
N Nq q q ϑ= − . 
B) Peak output *,0
Nq  is decreasing in adjustment cost parameter τ . 
C) *, 1 *,0 0
N Nq q+ >  and *, *0Lim ( 1) /[ ( 1)]NN q q ρ ρ→∞ = + + ∆ × − . 
D) The ratio of adjustment costs to output variance is given as 1 *, *, 2 *,10 ( ) / Var( )
N N N N
n nn
q q qτ − −= − =∑  
24 Sin ( / )N Nτ π× .  This is the least value the ratio can take. 
 
Part D) asserts that under cosine structured exogenous parameters the tradeoff between 
output variability to increase consumer and producer surplus and the adjustment costs of varying 
output is as low as it could possibly be.  When exogenous parameters are of form nϑ =  
Cos(2 / )n Nπ , then the gains from convexity in objective functions are bought as cheaply as 
adjustment costs could possibly allow.  Parts A) and B) provides some insights on Proposition 4.  
Production is less (more) than it would be absent adjustment costs when the production sequence 
is concave (convex).  For the cosine function, the sequence is concave on interval [ / 2, / 2)π π−  
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and convex on [ / 2,3 / 2)π π .  The production schedule is an amplitude modified version of the 
exogenous parameter vector. 
Part C) confirms a point suggested in part B); that peak and trough outputs become less 
constrained by adjustment costs as the number of periods increases.  This is because the 
adjustments in exogenous parameters become smaller from period to period as the number of 
periods increases.  When the partition of evaluations on the cosine function becomes sufficiently 
small, adjustment costs become infinitesimally small and do not affect production choices. 
Given that an increase in adjustment costs tends to flatten out the weighting vector, by part 
C) of proposition 8, it is natural to ask what impacts adjustment costs have on output variability.  
In order to address this question, and returning to the more general case where the nϑ  do not 
necessarily follow a trigonometric function, we will first develop a characterization of how an 
increase in adjustment costs smooths the ξ -dependent weighting vector.  
PROPOSITION 11:  For each 1 0ξ >  there exists an 1ξ -dependent finite real number 2 1ˆ ( )ξ ξ  
such that 2 1( ) ( )NCu uξ ξ≤   for all 2 2 1ˆ ( )ξ ξ ξ≥ .  
 
While we have not shown that 2 1 2 1( ) ( )NCu uξ ξ ξ ξ≤ ∀ ≥ , the smoothing partial order applies 
whenever 2ξ  is sufficiently large.  For 1* 1 *0( ) ( )
N
nn
q N qξ ξ−− == ∑ , 11 0N nnNϑ ϑ−− == ∑  and ( )U ξ  as 
the ξ -conditioned circulant with reference vector 0 1 1( ( ), ( ), ... , ( ))TNu u uξ ξ ξ− , (6.1) and part B) 
of proposition 8 provide  
(6.3) 1* 1 * * 2 1 2
0
Var[ ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( ).N Tnnq N q q N Uξ ξ ξ ϑ ϑ ξ ϑ ϑ
−− −
== − = − −∑  
Proposition 11 may be applied to conclude: 
PROPOSITION 12:  * *1 2 2 2 1ˆVar[ ( )] Var[ ( )] ( )q qξ ξ ξ ξ ξ≥ ∀ ≥ , 2 1ˆ ( )ξ ξ  defined in Proposition 11. 
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While an increase in the adjustment cost parameter does not affect aggregate output over the 
cycle in the linear model, we have found conditions under which it reduces output variance.  
Linearization has simplified the system in a mathematical way.  It will be shown that external 
trade opportunities provide an economic simplification.  
 
7.  EXTERNAL TRADE 
In the presence of an external, i.e., world, market then it is not necessary for production and 
consumption to match period-by-period even when product is non-storable.  All that matters is 
that the external market can be accessed to make up the difference.  For simplicity it is assumed 
that the period varying world price, wnp , is exogenous.  Write nq  and nx  as the n+1
st period 
production and consumption levels, respectively.  With linear-in-money preferences, then 
market welfare becomes 
(7.1) 
1 1
0 0 0
1 1 1
10 0 0
( , ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ).
nxN Nw
n n nn n
N N Nw
n n n n n nn n n
W q x p x A x dx
p q Y q B q q
α
β
− −
= =
− − −
−= = =
= − −
− − − − −
∑ ∑ ∫
∑ ∑ ∑  
Conditional on the wnp  values, external trade separates consumption from production.  The 
optimality conditions reflect this separation, 
(7.2) 
1 1
(7.2A) ( ) ;
(7.2B) ( ) ( ) ( ) ;
w
n n n N
w
n n q n q n n q n n N
p A x n
p Y q B q q B q q n
α
β − +
= − ∀ ∈Ω
= + + − − − ∀ ∈Ω  
with solution vectors * *,x q .  When looking at welfare effects it is convenient to note that the 
optimization problem presented in (7.1) may be separated into consumption and production 
problems.  With ˆ wpα α= −  and ˆ wpβ β= − , consumer and producer surpluses are respectively 
(7.3) 0 1 1
0 1 1
1 1
{ , , ... , } 0 0 0
1 1 1
{ , , ... , } 10 0 0
ˆ ˆ(7.3A) ( ) max ( ) ,
ˆ ˆ(7.3B) ( ) min ( ) ( ).
n
n
n
xN N
x x x n nn n
N N N
q q q n n n n nn n n
x A x dx
q Y q B q q
α α
β β
−
−
− −
= =
− − −Π
−= = =
= −
= + + −
∑ ∑ ∫
∑ ∑ ∑
^‹
‹
 
It is straightforward to show the following regularities for equilibrium decisions: 
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PROPOSITION 13:  A) Under external trade, both of the following are true 
(7.4) 1 1 1 1* * * *( ) ( )0 0 0 0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ , ,N N N Nn n n g n N n n n g n Nn n n nx x g S q q g Cα α β β
− − − −
= = = =≥ ∀ ∈ ≤ ∀ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
If, in addition, ( )B CS⋅ ∈  then  
(7.5) 1 1* * ( )0 0
ˆ ˆ .N Nn n n g n Nn nq q g Dβ β
− −
= =≤ ∀ ∈∑ ∑  
B) Consumption and demand parameters, net of period world prices, are matched, i.e., 
* *ˆ ˆ( )( ) 0 ,i j i j Nx x i jα α− − ≥ ∀ ∈Ω . 
C) Outputs correlate negatively with period unit costs net of period world prices, i.e., 
1 1* *
0 0
ˆ ˆN N
n n nn n
q qβ β− −= =≤∑ ∑ .  
 
Part A) clarifies that only demand heterogeneities matter in determining the share allocation 
of cycle consumption over periods, while only supply heterogeneities matter for production share 
allocations over periods.  Part B) writes the consumption implications in A) in a more convenient 
form.  This form does not apply on the production side because NC  and ND  invariances are too 
restrictive, but part C) presents a statistical interpretation of supply implications. 
The advent of an external market cannot reduce welfare.  Less obvious is how it affects the 
determinants of welfare.  An important insight for understanding how is to appreciate that 
NS
u v≤   implies 
ND
u v≤  , which in turn implies 
NC
u v≤  .13 
PROPOSITION 14:  A) ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ( )β α α′ ′′∀ ≤^ ^‹ ‹  whenever 
NS
α α′ ′′≤  . 
B) ˆ ˆˆ , ( ) ( )α β βΠ Π′ ′′∀ ≤‹ ‹  whenever 
NC
β β′ ′′≤  .  
C) If ( )B CS⋅ ∈  then ˆ ˆˆ , ( ) ( )α β βΠ Π′ ′′∀ ≤‹ ‹  whenever 
ND
β β′ ′′≤  .  
 
Part A) asserts that more dispersion among demand parameters is always beneficial, albeit 
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having adjusted for period world prices.  Heretofore how α  related to β  mattered too, but 
external trade breaks that link.  Furthermore, the sort of dispersion for α  in part A) is 
NS
≤   and 
not the more restrictive 
NC
≤   or 
ND
≤   as in proposition 5.  The symmetry generalization does not 
occur on the production side, see part B) of proposition 14, because adjustment costs remain.  
 
8.  DISCUSSION 
This paper has provided a deterministic framework for understanding markets exposed to 
adjustment costs and cyclic heterogeneities.  We have found that the number of periods in a 
cycle matters, and in rather subtle ways.  Notwithstanding the existence of adjustment costs, 
output does correlate positively with strength of demand over the cycle while price and strength 
of demand also correlate positively.  Despite the presence of adjustment costs, we also identify 
conditions under which more dispersion in market heterogeneities across periods is beneficial for 
welfare.  A linearized model provides insights on symmetries in equilibrium production levels 
and responses.  External trade affects the results, but the model adapts readily.  The linear model 
should allow an extension to endogenize world prices.  Concerning the realism of posited 
invariances, statistical methods exist to test for symmetry structures and it may be possible to 
adapt these to provide evidence on the plausibility of invariance assumptions.14  A further 
challenge would be to account for random demand and supply innovations, so as to better reflect 
the noisy cycles that firms, markets, and economies actually face. 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 This is because N N NC D S⊆ ⊆  . 
14 Serfling (2003) presents an overview of statistical tests for symmetries. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE 1 
CYCLIC 5 GROUP, 5C  
*=aftera e  1g  2g  3g  4g  
e  e  1g  2g  3g  4g  
1g  1g  2g  3g  4g  e  
2g  2g  3g  4g  e  1g  
3g  3g  4g  e  1g  2g  
4g  4g  e  1g  2g  3g  
 
a Column operation is after row operation 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
DIHEDRAL 5 GROUP, 5D  
*=aftera e  1g  2g  3g  4g  1h  2h  3h  4h  5h  
e  e  1g  2g  3g  4g  1h  2h  3h  4h  5h  
1g  1g  2g  3g  4g  e  2h  3h  4h  5h  1h  
2g  2g  3g  4g  e  1g  3h  4h  5h  1h  2h  
3g  3g  4g  e  1g  2g  4h  5h  1h  2h  3h  
4g  4g  e  1g  2g  3g  5h  1h  2h  3h  4h  
1h  1h  5h  4h  3h  2h  e  4g  3g  2g  1g  
2h  2h  1h  5h  4h  3h  1g  e  4g  3g  2g  
3h  3h  2h  1h  5h  4h  2g  1g  e  4g  3g  
4h  4h  3h  2h  1h  5h  3g  2g  1g  e  4g  
5h  5h  4h  3h  2h  1h  4g  3g  2g  1g  e  
 
a Column operation is after row operation 
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APPENDIX B 
Proof of Proposition 2:  For the cyclic group, the sum of adjustment costs is NC -invariant.  It is 
also convex.  A consequence of proposition 2.2, p. 834, in Eaton and Perlman (1977) is that if 
( ) : Mf x →\ \  is G -invariant and convex then 1 ( )0 ( ) ( ) / 0
M
m g m mm
x x f x x g G−= − ∂ ∂ ≥ ∀ ∈∑ , i.e., 
1
( )0
( ) / ( ) / 0M m g m mm f x x f x x x g G
−
=  ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ≥ ∀ ∈ ∑ .  Applying the inequality to aggregate 
adjustment costs under group NC  provides 1 * * * * * *1 1 ( )0 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
N
q n n q n n n g nn
B q q B q q q q− − +=  − − − − ≥ ∑  
Ng C∀ ∈ .  In addition, 1 * * * ( )0 ( )( ) 0
N
q n n g n Nn
Y q q q g C−= − ≥ ∀ ∈∑  because 10 ( )N nn Y q−=∑  is NS -invariant 
and convex while N NC S⊆  .  Thus,  
(B1) 1 * * * * * * *1 1 ( )0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 .
N
q n q n n q n n n g n Nn
Y q B q q B q q q q g C− − +=  + − − − − ≥ ∀ ∈ ∑  
Substitute in (4.4) to obtain (4.5).  Relation (4.6) follows similarly.  Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  For part A), sum optimality conditions (4.4) over all periods to obtain 
(4.7).  The remainder of the part follows immediately.  For part B), define 1n n nq qδ −≡ −  and 
0Nq q≡  where all subscripts are interpreted mod N.  Hence 1 10 [ ( ) ( )] 0
N
q n q nn
B Bδ δ− += − =∑  and  
(B2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1* * * * * * * * *1 10 0 0 0 ,N N N Nq n q n n q n n q n n q n nn n n nB B q B q B q Bδ δ δ δ δ δ− − − −+ −= = = = − = − = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
because 0Nδ δ= .  But 1 * *0 ( ) 0
N
q n nn
B δ δ−= ≥∑  as ( )B ⋅  is convex and 10 0N nn δ−= =∑ .  Continuing,  
(B3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1* * * * * * * *
10 0
1 1* * * * *
0 0
0,
N N
n n n n q n q n q n nn n
N N
q n n q n nn n
p q q q Y q B B q q
B Y q q q
β δ δ
δ δ
− −
+= =
− −
= =
   − − = + − −   
 = + − ≥ 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑  
where optimality conditions (4.4) and the property ( ) 0qq nY q ≥  have been used.  As for the 
second correlation in part B), substitute the demand function into (B3) to obtain 
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(B4) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1* * * * *
0 0
1 1 1 1 1* * * * * * *
0 0 0 0 0
0 ( )
( ) .
N N
n n n nn n
N N N N N
n n n n n n nn n n n n
q q A q q q
q q q q A q q q
γ
γ γ γ
− −
= =
− − − − −
= = = = =
≤ − − −
≤ − − − = −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
The correlation inequality has been used in relation (B4).  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  In part A), by standard arguments  
(B5) 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 00( ) = max ( ) ( ) ( )
nqN N N N
q n n n n nn n n n
q A q dq Y q B q qγ γ− − − − −= = = =− − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∫‹  
is convex in γ .  It is also NC -invariant because  
(B6) 
1 1 1
( )0 0 00
1
10
( ) ( ) max ( ) ( )
( ) ,
nqN N N
g q g n n nn n n
N
n n Nn
q A q dq Y q
B q q g C
γ γ γ− − −= = =
−
−=
≡ = − −
− − ∀ ∈
∑ ∑ ∑∫
∑
‹ ‹
 
where the welfare function’s cyclic symmetry has allowed us to re-label arguments.  Vector 
*( )q γ  will change as gγ γ→ , it must cycle too for function invariance would be violated 
otherwise.  But ( )γ‹  will not change as gγ γ→ .  Then apply Jensen’s inequality: ( )γ =‹  
1 1 1 10 1 1 0 1 1
( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( ... )
N Ng N g g N g
λ γ λ γ λ γ λ γ λ γ λ γ− −− −+ + + ≥ + + +‹ ‹ ‹ ‹ , whenever Nλ +∈\  and 
1
0
1N nn λ
−
= =∑ .  By construction, 1 10 1 1... N Ng N g Cλ γ λ γ λ γ γ−−+ + + ≤  .  Part B) follows similarly. 
Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6:  Write the optimality conditions for the linear system as  
(B7) 
*
0 0
*
1 1
*
22
*
22
*
11
1 2 0 0
1 2 0 0
0 1 2 0 0
,
0 0 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
NN
NN
q
q
q
q
q
ϑξ ξ ξ
ϑξ ξ ξ
ϑξ ξ
ξ ξ ϑ
ξ ξ ξ ϑ
−−
−−
 + − −        − + −          − +   =             + −       − − +    
#
#
#
" " " % " " ##
#
#
 
or *Aq ϑ=  where the symbols have the obvious interpretations.  Solve to obtain *q Uϑ=  where  
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(B8) 
1 2 2 2 2 1
1 1 3 3 2 2
2 2 1 4 4 3 3
1 2 2 3 3 1
1
1
1 .1
( 1)
1
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N
N N N N N
U
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
 + + + + + + + + + +  = + + + + +∆ × −    + + + + + 
#
#
#
" " " % " "
#
 
Weighting positivity is obvious.  Algebra confirms 1
0
( ) ( 1)N n N n N
n
ρ ρ ρ− −= + ≡ ∆ × −∑ .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7:  Part A): With adjustment costs, profits are  
(B9) 1 2 2 10( ) ( ) 0.5 ( ) ,
N
n n n n n n nn
p q q q q qγ β χ τ− −=  Π = − − − − ∑  
where we have used cyclic property 1 12 2 10 0
N N
n nn n
q q− − −= ==∑ ∑  under modular arithmetic.  Define  
(B10) 
0 0 0
1 1 1
2 2 21
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
; ; ; ,0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0N N N
p q
p q
p qP E q
p q
β
β
ββ
β
−
− − −
                        ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡                        
#
#
#
" " " % " " "# # #
#
 
where circulant 1E−  is obtained from the identity matrix by a backward cycling of each row.  
Observe that 
(B11) ( ) 11 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
,
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
TE E −− −
    = =      
#
#
#
" " " % " " "
#
#
 
so that the transpose of 1E−  equals the inverse of 1E−  and both equal the matrix representing the 
forward cycling of each row in the identity matrix.   
From (B9), profits and the profit-maximizing condition are  
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(B12) 
{ }
{ }
1
1 1
( ) 0.5( 2 ) ,
( 2 ) ( ) 0.
T T T T
T
P q q E q
d P E E q
dq
β χ τ τ
β χ τ τ
−
− −
 Π = − − + + 
Π = − − + − + =  
Solving generates optimal choice vector  
(B13) ( )* 1 1; 2 ( ) ; / ;TN NGq P G I I E Eχ β υ υ τ χ− − = − ≡ + − + ≡   
where NI  is the rank N identity.  Insert back into (B12) to obtain optimal producer surplus as 
(B14) ( )* * *0.5 .Tq GqχΠ =  
Notice that G  is a circulant whose rows and columns sum to one.  It is readily shown that 
1G−  is bistochastic, see footnote 11.  From proposition 6, equilibrium output is 
(B15) ( )* 1 1where ; 2 ( ) ; .Tnn N NAq A I I E Eγ τϑ ϑ ξ ξκ χ κ χ− −= = = + − + =+ +  
Re-write matrix G  as  
(B16) .NG A I
κ χ κ
χ κ χ
 +≡ − + 
 
Using (B13)-(B16), optimal producer surplus can be written as  
(B17) ( )* 1 1 1 20.5( ) ; ,TT NM M A A I A A Aκ κκ χ ϑ ϑ κ χ κ χ− − − − Π = + ≡ − = − + +   
where the fact that 1A−  is symmetric has been used.  
If nλ  is an eigenvalue of 1A−  then it is readily shown that 2 /( )n n nη λ κλ κ χ= − +  is an 
eigenvalue of M  and that every eigenvector of 1A−  is an eigenvector of M .  Since 1A−  is a 
bistochastic, symmetric circulant, all its eigenvalues are real, non-negative and no larger than 
one.  Hence, all eigenvalues of M  are non-negative (and strictly less than one).  Furthermore, 
since M  is real and symmetric, it has a full set of eigenvectors, call them 0 1( , ... , )Nv v −
G G , that 
span N\  and that can be chosen to be orthonormal.  Hence, any vector u∈G  N\  can be written 
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as a linear combination of these eigenvectors; 1
0
N
n nn
u vω−==∑G G .  By the choice of an orthonormal 
base, this implies  
(B18) ( ) ( )1 1 1 20 0 0 0N N NT Tn n n n n nn n nu Mu v M vω ω ω η− − −= = == = ≥∑ ∑ ∑G G G G  
since Tn m nmv v δ=G G , the Kronecker delta function with value 1 whenever n m=  and zero 
otherwise.  Thus, M  is positive semi-definite.  It is also a circulant.  Part A) follows. 
Part B): Consumer surplus is 
*
1 1 1* * * 2
0 0 00
( ) ( ) ( ) 0.5 ( )n
qN N N
n n n n nn n n
p q dq p q q qγ κ− − −= = == − =∑ ∑ ∑∫^ .  
Expression 1 * 2
0
( )N nn q
−
=∑  is symmetric and convex in period equilibrium quantities.  Given the 
linear system, each *( )nq γ  is linear in γ .  Further, proposition 3 has shown that aggregate output 
1 *
0
N
nn
q−=∑  is fixed on simplex 10N nn γ−=∑  so we need not be concerned that the shift γ γ′ ′′→ , with 
NC
γ γ′ ′′≤  , induces a change in the value of 1 *0
N
nn
q−=∑ .  From (6.1), 1 * 20 [ ( )]N nn q γ−=∑  is also ND -
invariant, 1 1* 2 * 2
0 0
[ ( )] [ ( )]N Nn n g Nn nq q g Dγ γ
− −
= == ∀ ∈∑ ∑ .  Then apply Jensen’s inequality: ( )γ =^  
( ) ( )
N N
g g g gg D g D
λ γ λ γ∈ ∈≥∑ ∑^ ^  whenever g Ng Dλ +∈ ∀ ∈\  and 1N gg D λ∈ =∑ .15  To 
demonstrate that the value of 1 * 2
0
( )N nn s
−
=∑  increases under γ γ′ ′′→ , write 1 * 20 ( )N nn s−= =∑  
11 * 2
0
2 ( ) /( )N nn qκ γ
−−
=∑^  where the denominator is invariant to the shift γ γ′ ′′→ .  Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 8:  Parts A) and B) follow from inspection of (B8).  The first two limits in 
part C) are due to the facts that 0Limξ ρ→ = ∞  and the dominant power wins out in limits of 
polynomial ratios as a variable goes to infinity.  For the final limit in part C), note Lim 1ξ ρ→∞ =  
                                                 
15 In this notation it is important to recognize that, in contrast to the subscripted g in Ngγ ∈\ , the 
subscripted g in gλ +∈\  is not a group operation.  Rather it is the identifier on simplex 
weighting coordinate gλ  in the summation over group operation set NG D=  acting on vector γ . 
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and Lim / Lim ( ) /( ) 1m N m n N nm nu uξ ξ ρ ρ ρ ρ− −→∞ →∞= + + =  so that all weightings converge to the 
uniform weighting as adjustment costs become arbitrarily large.  For assertion 1n nu u +>  in part 
D), the inequality may be written as 1 1n N n n N nρ ρ ρ ρ− + − −+ > + , or ( 1) / 2 2N − > .  
For the monotone derivative in part D), assume (the other case follows similarly) that 
( 1) / 2N n− > .  Clearly, / 0d dρ ξ ≤ .  Differentiate 1 /n nu u+ = 2 1 2( ) /(1 )N n N nρ ρ ρ− − −+ + , 
(B19) 
4[0.5( 1) ] 2 2 2
1
2 2
( / ) 1 2[0.5( 1) ]( ) 0.
(1 )
N n N n N n
n n
N n
d u u N n d
d d
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ξ ρ ξ
− − − − −
+
−
− − − − −= ≥+  
Turning to part E), let 1 1
0 0
N N
n nn n
ϑ ϑ− −= =′ ′′= = Φ∑ ∑ .  Then  
(B20) 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2
0 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 3 0 1 1 2 2
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2
( ) ( ) ... ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
... ( )( ) ,
N N N N N
N N N
N N N N N
q u u u u
u u u u u u
u u u
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ
ϑ ϑ
− − − − +
− − −
− − − + −
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + + + +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − + + + − + + + +
′ ′+ + − Φ− − + Φ
 
for 1N −  even and  
(B21) 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 ( 2) / 2 ( 2) / 2 ( 2) / 2 / 2 / 2
0 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 3 0 1 1 2 2
( 2) / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2
( ) ( ) ... ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
... ( )( ) ,
N N N N N N N
N N N
N N N N
q u u u u u
u u u u u u
u u u
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ
ϑ
− − − − +
− − −
−
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + + + + +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − + + + − + + + +
′+ + − Φ − + Φ
 
for 1N −  odd.  The result follows from applying the set of dominance summation relations in 
part E) to (B20) and (B21).  As to part F), see part B) and equation (6.1).  Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 9:  Let market parameter vector ϑ  be unimodal and centrally symmetric 
around 0n = .  Without loss of generality we may characterize the vector as of uniform 
weighting on a connected subset mJ  of NΩ , 1 1 0 1 1... ... 1m m m mϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ− − − −= = = = = = = = =  
and 0nϑ =  otherwise.  All other vectors that are centrally symmetric and unimodal around 
period 0 can be constructed by taking positive combinations and limits of this weighting set, 
e.g., 2 02J J+ .  Thus, under modular arithmetic, 
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(B22) 
1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 01
2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
, ,
, , ,
m m
n n m m m mn m n m
m m r r r m r m r r
q u q q u q u u q u u q
q q q u u q q q q u u q
+
− + − +=− = −
− + + − − + + − −
= = = = + − = + − ≤
= = + − ≤ = = + − ≤
∑ ∑
………
 
and the decline continues as r  increases until the output at issue is phased halfway around the 
circle from 0q .  Then the added term is larger than the dropped term and rq  begins to increase 
toward peak output 0q .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 10: Part A): To demonstrate (6.2A), insert coefficients in (6.1) to obtain  
(B23) 
-1
0*, *
( )Cos[2 ( ) / ]
.
( 1)
N j N j
jN
n N
n j N
q q
ρ ρ π
ρ
−
= + +− = ∆ × −
∑
 
We seek to show  
(B24) 
-1
0*, *
Cos(2 / ) ( )Cos(2 / )
.
( 1)
N j N j
jN
n N
n N j N
q q
π ρ ρ π
ρ
−
= +− = ∆ × −
∑
 
A readily demonstrated trigonometric relationship is Cos(2 / )Cos(2 / )n N j Nπ π =  
0.5 Cos[2 ( ) / ] 0.5 Cos[2 ( ) / ]n j N n j Nπ π× + + × − , so our claim in part A) can be written as  
(B25) 
-1
0*, *
0.5 ( )(Cos[2 ( ) / ] Cos[2 ( ) / ])
.
( 1)
N j N j
jN
n N
n j N n j N
q q
ρ ρ π π
ρ
−
=× + + + −− = ∆ × −
∑
 
To reconcile (B25) with (B23), it is necessary and sufficient to establish  
(B26) -1 -1
0 0
( )Cos[2 ( ) / ] ( )Cos[2 ( ) / ].N Nj N j j N j
j j
n j N n j Nρ ρ π ρ ρ π− −= =+ − = + +∑ ∑  
Central symmetry assures -1 -1
0 0
Cos[2 ( ) / ] Cos[2 ( ) / ]N NN j i
j i
n j N n i N Nρ π ρ π−= =− = + − =∑ ∑  
-1 -1
0 0
Cos[2 ( ) / ] Cos[2 ( ) / ]N Ni j
i j
n i N n j Nρ π ρ π= =+ = +∑ ∑ .  Likewise, -10 Cos[2 ( ) / ]N jj n j Nρ π= −∑  
-1
0
Cos[2 ( ) / ]N N j
j
n j Nρ π−== +∑  and (B26) is validated.  
To verify (6.2B), we need to show that 
 32
(B27) 
-1
0*, *
0 2
( )Cos(2 / ) ( 1)( 1) ,
( 1) [ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1]
N j N j
jN
N
j N
q q
N
ρ ρ π ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ π
−
= + − +− = =∆ × − ∆ × − +
∑
 
i.e., that 
(B28) -1 20
( 1)( 1)( 1)( )Cos(2 / ) .
[ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1]
N
N j N j
j
j N
N
ρ ρ ρρ ρ π ρ ρ π
−
=
− − ++ = − +∑  
Break (B28) into two parts, 1L  and 2L , considering first 
-1
1 0
Cos(2 / )N j
j
L j Nρ π==∑ .  Write 
2 /[Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] i Nz N i N e πρ π π ρ= × + × = ×  in the complex plane.  Then, by De Moivre’s 
theorem, 1L  is the real part of 
-1
0
N j
j
z=∑  because -1 -10 0Re( ) Re( )N Nj jj jz z= == =∑ ∑  
-1
0
Cos(2 / )N j
j
j Nρ π=∑ .  By the truncated summation formula 
(B29) ( )-10 1 1Re Re Re ,1 [Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] 1N NN jj zz z N i Nρρ π π=    − −= =   − × + × −   ∑  
because 2N N i Nz e πρ ρ= = .  Using complex conjugates, we also have 
(B30) 2
1 ( 1)( [Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] 1)
[Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] 1 2 Cos(2 / ) 1
N N N i N
N i N N
ρ ρ ρ π π
ρ π π ρ ρ π
− − × − × −=× + × − − × +  
so that  
(B31) 1 2
1 ( 1)[ Cos(2 / ) 1]Re .
[Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] 1 2 Cos(2 / ) 1
N N NL
N i N N
ρ ρ ρ π
ρ π π ρ ρ π
 − − × −= = × + × − − × + 
 
And for -1 -12 0 0Cos(2 / ) Cos(2 / )
N NN j N j
j j
L j N j Nρ π ρ ρ π− −= == =∑ ∑ , substituting in 1ρ−  for ρ  
in (B29), with 1 1 2 /[Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] i Nz N i N e πρ π π ρ− −= × + × = ×  and following through 
confirms the value of 2L  as  
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(B32) 
( )-1 10
1
2 1 2
1 1Re Re Re
1 [Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )] 1
(1 )[ Cos(2 / ) 1] (1 ) [Cos(2 / ) ] .
2 Cos(2 / ) 1 1 2 Cos(2 / )
N N
NN j
j
N N
z
z N i N
N N
N N
ρ ρρ ρ π π
ρ ρ π ρ ρ π ρ
ρ ρ π ρ π ρ
−=
−
− −
   − −= =   − × + × −   
− × − − × −= =− × + − × +
∑
 
Upon summing, 21 2 ( 1)( 1)( 1) /[ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1]
NL L Nρ ρ ρ ρ ρ π+ = − − + − +  as sought.  Finally 
observe that 1ρ >  when τ  is finite and that N  finite implies both |Cos(2 / ) | 1Nπ <  and 
2 2 Cos(2 / ) 1 0Nρ ρ π− × + > . 
Part B): With no adjustment costs, then *, *0 1
Nq q= + .  We claim that, (1, )ρ∀ ∈ ∞ , 
2( 1)( 1) /( [ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1]) (0,1)Nρ ρ ρ ρ π− + ∆ × − × + ∈  where 1 (1 ) /(2 )ρ ξ= + + ∆ , 1 4ξ∆ = + , 
and 0ξ > , as previously defined.  To demonstrate this claim, note that 22 ( 1) / 2ξ = ∆ −  so that 
1 2 /( 1)ρ = + ∆ − .  Substitution provides  
(B33) 
2 2 2 2
2
( 1)( 1) 4
[ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1] ( 1) 2( 1)Cos(2 / ) ( 1)
2 (0,1),
[1 Cos(2 / )] [1 Cos(2 / )]
N N
N N
ρ ρ
ρ ρ π π
π π
− + =∆ × − × + ∆ + − ∆ − + ∆ −
= ∈∆ − + +
 
where positivity is immediate and upper limit 1 is due to the following logic.  The upper limit is 
true if relation 2 2 24 ( 1) 2( 1)Cos(2 / ) ( 1)Nπ< ∆ + − ∆ − + ∆ −  applies, i.e., (from repackaging 
terms) if 2( 1)[1 Cos(2 / )] 0Nπ∆ − − > .  This latter condition is clearly true for N  finite.  In 
addition, note that expression 2( 1)( 1) /( [ 2 Cos(2 / ) 1])Nρ ρ ρ ρ π− + ∆ × − × +  is decreasing in ξ  
(and so in τ ) so that higher adjustment costs unambiguously lower peak output. 
Part C): Monotonicity of (6.2B) in N  is immediate for 2N ≥ .  Also, take the limit in 
(6.2B) noting that Cos(0) 1= . 
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Part D): A variant on the Wirtinger inequality, as given in Block (1957), asserts that if 
1 1Nx x− −=  and 10 0
N
nn
x−= =∑  then 1 12 2 210 0( ) / 4Sin ( / )N Nn n nn nx x x Nπ− −−= =− ≥∑ ∑ .  The inequality is an 
equality if and only if each nx  takes form 1 2Cos(2 / ) Sin(2 / )nx A n N A n Nπ π= + .  But part A) has 
demonstrated that this form is taken.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 11:  Set 2 1ξ ξ>  with adjustment cost conditioned weighting vectors ( )u ξ =  
0 1 1( ( ), ( ), ... , ( ))
T
Nu u uξ ξ ξ− .  If 2 1( ) ( )NCu uξ ξ≤   then, from definition 1, there exists a weighting 
vector, 12 1 2 1 2 10{ ( ; ) [0,1] : ( ; ) 0 , ( ; ) 1}
NN
n N nn
nλ ξ ξ λ ξ ξ λ ξ ξ−=∈ ≥ ∀ ∈Ω =∑ , such that  
(B34) 
1 10 2 0 1 1 1
0 1 2 11 2 1 1
0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
0 11 2 1 1 2 1
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ; ) ( ; ) ... ( ; ).
( )( ) ( ) ( )
N
N
N N N
uu u u
u uu u
uu u u
ξξ ξ ξ
ξ ξξ ξ λ ξ ξ λ ξ ξ λ ξ ξ
ξξ ξ ξ
−
−
− − −
                  = + + +                  
## # #  
Re-arrange the right-hand side as the product of the λ  weighting vector and a matrix previously 
labeled as U .  The inverse is given in (B7) above so that  
(B35) 
0 2 0
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1
1 2 1
( )
1 2 0
( )
1 2 0 0
.
( )
0 1 2
( )
N N
N N
u
u
u
u
ξ λξ ξ ξ ξ λξ ξ
ξ λξ ξ ξ ξ λ
− −
− −
   + − −          − +     =          − − +       
#
# # #" " % " "
#
 
By part C) of proposition 8, 
2
1
2Lim ( ) (1,1, ... ,1)
Tu Nξ ξ −→∞ =  so that 2 2 1Lim ( ; )ξ λ ξ ξ→∞ =  
1(1,1, ... ,1)TN − .  By continuity of each 2 1( ; )nλ ξ ξ , there exists a 2 1ˆ ( )ξ ξ  such that 
0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
ˆmin{ ( ; ), ( ; ), ... , ( ; )} 0 ( )Nλ ξ ξ λ ξ ξ λ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ− ≥ ∀ ≥ .  Therefore, 2 1 2( ) ( )NCu uξ ξ ξ≤ ∀ ≥  
2 1
ˆ ( )ξ ξ .  Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 12:  Write 1 2Var[ ( )] Var[ ( )]q qξ ξ−  as  
(B36) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 2 2
1 2
( ) [ ( )] ( )( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )( )
( ) [ ( )] [ ( )] ( ).
T T T T
T
N U U N U U
N U U
ϑ ϑ ξ ξ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ξ ξ ϑ ϑ
ϑ ϑ ξ ξ ϑ ϑ
− −
−
− − − − −
= − − −  
A property of circulant matrices with defining vector 0 1 1( , , ... , )Nu u u −  on the unit simplex is that 
one eigenvalue is 1σ =  while any distinct eigenvalue, real or complex, satisfies the radius of 
convergence criterion | | 1σ <  [Davis (1979 p. 132)].  Proposition 11 showed conditions under 
which 2 1( ) ( )NCu uξ ξ≤  .  But from Giovagnoli and Wynn (1996, p. 219) this means there exists a 
circulant S

 with defining vector 0 1 1( , , ... , )
T
Ns s s −  on the unit simplex such that 2 1( ) ( )u Suξ ξ=  , 
2 1( ) ( )U SUξ ξ=  , and 2 22 1[ ( )] [ ( )]U SUξ ξ=  .  We seek to understand when 
2 2
1 1( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( ) 0
T TU SUϑ ϑ ξ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ξ ϑ ϑ− − − − − ≥ , and so we require information on the 
eigenvalues of the difference.  
The n n×  Fourier matrix F  with complex number entries is defined as follows.  Set ω  as 
the nth root of unity, i.e., 1nω =  and write  
(B37) 
2 2 1
* 2 4 2( 2) 2( 1)
1 2( 1) ( 2)( 1) ( 1)( 1)
1 1 1 1 1
1
.1
1
n n
n n
n n n n n n
F
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
− −
− −
− − − − − −
    =     
#
#
#
" " " % " "
#
 
Fourier matrix F  is the complex conjugate of *F , i.e., *F F=  where the bar represents the 
conjugation operation.  Thus, * * nFF F F I= = .  The matrices are useful because if S  is a 
circulant then *S F F= Λ  where Λ  is diagonal.  From Davis (1979, pp. 72-73) the diagonal 
entries in Λ  are an ordering of the eigenvalues for S .  
If 1S  and 2S  are circulants then 1 2S S  is also.  A second property is that if 1S  and 2S  are 
circulants with respective ordered eigenvalue sets (from the top along the diagonal) established 
by the Fourier matrix diagonalization as 1 1,0 1,1 1, 1( , , ... , )
T
nσ σ σ σ −=  and 2σ =  
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2,0 2,1 2, 1( , , ... , )
T
nσ σ σ − , then the eigenvalue vector of 3 1 2S S S=  is the component-wise product of 
1σ  and 2σ .16  So 3 1,0 2,0 1,1 2,1 1, 1 2, 1( , , ... , )Tn nσ σ σ σ σ σ σ− −= .  To see this, suppose *1 1S F F= Λ  and 
*
2 2S F F= Λ .  Then * * *1 2 1 2 1 2S S F FF F F F= Λ Λ = Λ Λ  where 1 2Λ Λ  is diagonal.  If 1S  and 2S  are 
circulants with defining vectors on the unit simplex, then 1 2S S  is a circulant with defining vector 
on the unit simplex.  Since the modulus of a product is the product of the moduli, the eigenvalues 
of 1 2S S  have moduli as follows; 1,0 2,0 1,1 2,1 1, 1 2, 1(| |, | |, ... , | |)n nσ σ σ σ σ σ− − =  
1,0 2,0 1,1 2,1 1, 1 2, 1(| || |, | || |, ... , | || |)n nσ σ σ σ σ σ− − .  Let 1S S=  , the circulant that smooths 1( )U ξ  to 
2( )U ξ  in proposition 11, and let 2 1( )S U ξ= .  So 1,| | 1i Niσ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω , 21,| | 1i Niσ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω  and 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1,0 2,0 1,1 2,1 1, 1 2, 1 2,0 2,1 2, 1(| | | | , | | | | , ... , | | | | ) (| | , | | , ... , | | )n n nσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ− − −≤  where the 
comparison is entry-wise.  By Theorem 4.5.5. in Davis, this means 
( )1 2 22 1( ) [ ( )] [ ( )] ( ) 0TN U Uϑ ϑ ξ ξ ϑ ϑ− − − − ≤ .  Q.E.D.
                                                 
16 See Davis (1979, pp. 91-92). 
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